‘Subcultures are beautifully broken codes’ (Hebdige, 1979, P. 37). With the expansion of internet, on the one hand, digital media technologies now could ‘offer novel ways of cultural production’ (Li, Tan, & Yang, 2019, P. 3). On the other hand, audiences are also hooked to the Web through at least potentially ‘perpetual contact’ anytime, anywhere. (Katz & Aakhus, 2002). Behind this, subcultures, which used to be ‘marginal, mystical, even nihilistic’ (Hebdige, 1979, P.117), now could also be provided a chance to become ‘popular codes’ for audience in some extents. How does it happen? As Hebdige (1979) argues, there are two forms of subculture’s incorporation to the society, which are the commodity form and the ideological form. The commodity form refers to the conversion of subcultural signs into mass-produced objects, while the ideological form refers to the labeling and re-definition of deviant behavior by dominant groups - the police, the media, the judiciary. (P.171) However, in China, one short video app named Kuaishou shows a different interplay between cultural formats and audiences’ adaptations. It provides a type of subculture: ‘earthy culture’ (tuweiwenhua) a different path to become visible by one genre, ‘earthy video’(tuweishipin). According to the ‘Chinese Short-Video Industry Annual Inventory Analysis 2018’(Yi,2018), as of February 2018, the active users of short video platforms increased to 403.5 million, in which, Kuaishou, with its unique characteristics: reciprocal-valued algorithm, the special business model and the hot-topic dispute over its authenticity and surveillance, has undoubtedly become the ‘topstar’ in this industry (Shi, 2019). After Kuaishou changed its main functions from producing animated.gif images to short videos (Li, Tan, & Yang, 2019, P.3), in 2014, a series of social shaking (Shehuiyao) dance became a hit in Kuaishou, which is not the first emerge of earthy videos, but could be a beginning of its popularity. (Xiao, 2018). There are many different views on earthy videos. In this article, we would pick the one with least emotions, that earthy videos are defined as ‘short videos, in the form of dance or melodrama, produced by rural Kuaishou youth users.’
In this paper, some questions will be raised and attempted to be resolved respectively: In what ways can the concepts of subculture be applied to Kuaishou video? What are the main characteristics of earthy video? How and why does this cultural production, generated from rural users, also become popular in urban areas? Is there any difference in the extent of earthy videos’ popularity between audiences in different areas?
The remaining essay shall proceed as follows: firstly, as background, the relationship among class, taste and people’s cultural distinction, are discussed following the line of argumentation of Birmingham School youth subculture theory and Bourdieu’s theory of class distinction. Next, the development and main features of Kuaishou and earthy videos are introduced to answer the question: how does earthy video become popular? Thirdly, the data gathered from survey and interview will be analyzed to better understand audiences’ attitude to earthy videos to answer the following question: why does earthy videos become popular? The research data was gathered from 5 users belonging to the rural audiences in Shenyang, Liaoning Province and 10 users who form part of the urban segment of audience in Shenzhen, Guangdong province (involving those who migrant from rural areas to Shenzhen). Besides, visual discourse analysis will also be used into analyzing and comparing different video contents.
Finally, we come to conclusions that, firstly, the main cause of audiences’ different preference to earthy videos is their different extent of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 2005). Besides, this ‘cultural intimacy’ can also be constructed by several elements, that is, audience's initiative, rationality, social circles, social status, interests and aesthetic difference. Secondly, as cross-border media flows, kuaishou and earthy videos could make cultural complexity (Hannerz 1992; Iwabuchi 2002) more salient as they have more abilities to build new forms of ‘imagined communities’ based on audiences’ ‘digital cultural intimacy’. Lastly but the most importantly, the process of earthy videos, as one ‘subculture’ transferring to ‘pop culture’ is not only based on capitalism and commercialism, but more built on hegemonic ideologies of audiences themselves, then generate stereotypes and illusions towards those cultural productions. All said, what is ‘popular’? The ‘popular’ is a paradox filled with colorful but not-easily- punctured bubbles.
Literature Review: Class, Taste and Cultural Distinction
As the target interviewees are users in urban and rural areas, to underscore population degree of earthy videos in the urban/rural cultural settings, this part will focus on the relation of class and cultural taste, especially using Bourdieu's arguments about ‘taste’ and Hetzfeld’s concept of ‘cultural intimacy’ as interlinked tools with Birmingham School youth subculture theory.
Appearing in the 1970s at the Centre of Contemporary Cultural Studies, Birmingham University, the Birmingham School (also refers as CCCS) argues the relevance of social structures for the study of subcultures and links ‘class’ with the process of social formation, shifting its focus to the underlying class or the working class, such as Dick Hebdige (1979) ‘s topic of resistance, style and incorporation of the subculture in working class (P.28) and Paul Willis’ focus on the anti-school culture of the working class ‘lads’ . However, with the work of CCCS has been criticized as ‘overestimated the explanatory importance of class’ (Gilroy, 1993), several authors have also pointed to other relevance influenciing people’s cultural aesthetic taste such as ethnicity (the Chicago School), race, gender (McRobbie, 1990) and lifestyle (Bennett &Kahn-Harris, 2004). Especially in todays’ youth cultural terrains, it should be emphasized that class is not the only social structure for understanding subcultures and the CCCS works should also be theorized and applied differently now, compared to Britain in the 1970s. (Jensen, 2018) Based on that, the concepts of subculture and the role of ‘class’ need to be rethought.
According to that, Bourdieu’s contributions on aesthetic taste could offer us a more hierarchical vision of class, with cultural taste, which could also applicable to analyze the reason why earthy videos’ becoming popular, not only in its origin--rural areas, but also in those ‘urban elites’. Firstly, Bourdieu admitted there is ‘a strong link exists between objective class position and cultural preferences’ by understanding ‘class’ through the metaphor of society as a ‘social space’ (Bourdieu, 1979, P.201) Bourdieu claims that how individual chooses to present his/her social space by one's aesthetic dispositions could depict one's status and distances himself/herself from lower groups. ‘The tastes in culture are indicators of class’ (Bourdieu, 1979, P.184). However, the ‘social space’ is bio-dimensioned by Bourdieu, who points out that ‘this objective social space – the space of positions – is paralleled by a space of positionings’ (Bourdieu, 1979, P.201). The latter describes the elements to constructing ‘class’, that is ‘taste, distaste, (life)style preferences, ideas of morality, political opinions and so forth’ (Jensen, 2018) It means that people’s cultural distinctions (no matter it is good, popular or vulgar), do not only reflect existing class structure, also actively ‘produce and reproduce class’ (Bourdieu, 1979, P.195),which could be proved in this paper.
Compared to CCCS, Bourdieu’s argument on the relation of class and taste similarly shows how class could be seen as an important factor for subcultural formation, however, differently, he see people could own a relative autonomy of culture, he provides choice for people, not only for choosing their preferred culture, but also for choosing and changing their class in their later daily life, although it is tough in any era, in any area. As Jensen comments to Bourdieu’s literature, ‘class dispositions, or classed habitusses, do not therefore determine subcultural affiliation, but they are likely to play a role for the (socially structured) ‘choice’ of subculture’ (Jensen, 2018, P.9)
Moreover, in today's era, people's cultural taste has become more complicated. In addition to the above elements, commercialization has become an increasingly influential factor. Ma (2010) argues the relationship between sub-culture and cultural industry is a field ‘full of tension, interdependence and interdependence, and a dynamic system with multiple and complex elements.’ Moreover, in today's context of new media, consumer society and globalization, business incorporation is more likely to ‘weaken subculture resistance and even become another popular culture’ (P.67). Based on that, in addition to those people (who is in lower class)’s own promotion to change their class and cultural taste, fast growing cultural industry is also a powerful driver. Here comes a question: It is encouraged to see people from lower classes pursue for upper culture, but what if people from upper levels have fancy with ‘vulgar sub-culture’ such as urban users love earthy videos? How can we explain these ‘unusual preference’? On the basis of Bourdieu’s contributions on aesthetic taste and CCCS subculture studies, here brings another concept-- cultural intimacy to more appropriately describe this status. As Bourdieu argues, ‘different individuals have differences in the choice of cultural consumption patterns. Between cultural elites and the lower classes, we can express this difference with several sets of opposite adjectives such as elegance-popularity, form-function, profound-superficial, decent-rude’. (Bourdieu, 1979, P.195) The theory of cultural intimacy shows more purposes for people to make their cultural choices, especially toward these ‘vulgar and earthy’ culture in a dynamic and struggleful way, such as self-deprecating, needs for belonging or identity proving.
Cultural intimacy, derived from a Greek village in which Hetzfeld conducted field surveys, was originally used to refer to an inclusiveness or community identity of villagers. This inclusiveness may build in some ‘embarrassing and private lifestyles and social products’. The process of identification is also a process of ‘mutual understanding’ in the community. Now in many cases, this ‘embarrassing’ privacy shared by individuals, families, communities and all levels of the nation-state constitutes a kind of collective cultural intimacy. (Herzfeld, 2005, P.20) It is precisely because of the existence of cultural intimacy that different levels of "rigid and fixed class" can be eliminated in some extent. Cultural intimacy is the recognition of certain cultural characteristics shared by both the official and the public, which, as a source of internal consciousness, provides a guarantee of common sociality for its members. (Herzfeld, 2005, P.35)
However, individuals also have a chance to be ‘individualized’, which means individuals also could actively get rid of their original cultural circle, and then create new intimacy with other culture.’ (Herzfeld, 2005, P.35) In this point, cultural intimacy could not show and prove ‘a shared familiarity’, but also is denied and repressed rather than simply abandoned for a ‘new’ experience of intimacy with the unfamiliar. This status of ‘rebelling and distinguishing’ could also reflect individual’s struggle of class, go back to Bourdieu, that is ‘the social space – the space of positions – is paralleled by a space of positionings’. (Bourdieu, 1979, P.201) What these two concepts have in common is that, they both connect cultural taste with class, and accordingly, class has been provide a space to be reconstructed in this ‘positioning’ process.
Two recent literatures apply this theory into their research in Chinese context. Professor Chris K. K from Nanjing University argues, one of the differences from Tik-Tok is Kuaishou offer users a sense of cultural intimacy with wanghong (micro-celebrity) so that they all want to become such people who get popular and well- incomed in Kuaishou and seem familiar with them in social background, however, Their admiration of Kuaishou celebrities will not be presented publicly, because micro celebrities in Kuaishou is a rather ‘embarrassing identity’ in society. However, because of their ‘private intimacy’ to the so called ‘vulgar’ culture, they could also gather a community and find ‘partners’ in it. that is, those young people in small towns who kill their time in Kuaishou and are eager to become famous one day. (Li, Tan, & Yang, 2019, P.10) Peidong Yang, Lijun Tang and Xuan Wang illustrate examines a recent bizarre phenomenon on China’s Internet: ‘diaosi’, as an approach of ‘cyber ritual communion’. They interpret the diaosi as ‘scatological online culture that defies hyper normalization, that seeks to become a practice of cultural intimacy.’ (Yang, Tang & Wang, 2015, P.1)
In conclusion, this paper will study cultural intimacy in a specific subculture production, earthy video, in the angle of audience analysis, aiming to continue to solve one main question for better understanding the connection among class distinction, subculture and cultural taste: how and why does this cultural production, generated from rural users, also become popular, but in a different extent, in urban areas?
Kuaishou and Earthy Videos: The Circulation from Countryside to City
In this chapter we seek to recognize the longer history, while also reflecting upon the dramatic nature of Kuaishou and earthy videos’ transformations over the past eight years.
Kuaishou, an interesting but paradoxical platform, has always been rolled into the center dispute since its birth in 2011, although its average month capacity of daily active users has reached 100 million by December 2018. To sum up, Kuaishou has met two main controversial issues: business strategy and the balance of content authenticity and regulations
Business strategy.
Since born, Kuaishou always follows the strategy of ‘encircling the city from the countryside’. It is one high-tech company built by elites, which office is in Zhongguancun, where the most advanced computer technology in China is gathered, adjacent to Chinese highest education institutions: Tsinghua University and Peking University. The CEO Hua Su also graduated from Tsinghua University and worked for Google and Baidu before. Similar with him, Kuaishou owns thousands of top software engineers in China.
However, the main users of Kuaishou are those 'non-elite, non-mainstream users'. In terms of geographical distribution, the popularity rate of the Kuaishou in the four-tier cities is higher than that of Tiktok, which is also its main user group (40.3%). Meanwhile, only 9.5% of the Kuaishou users are distributed in the first-tier cities. (Tencent, 2018)
Although Kuaishou’s business model seems to be contradictory, it is very sensible to combine with the current development of contemporary China. Recently, Chinese National Development and Reform Commission and other 10 departments jointly issued the ‘Implementation of Optimizing Supply to Promote Steady Growth in Consumption and Promote the Formation of a Strong Domestic Market (2019)’, pointing out that it is necessary to stimulate urban and rural consumption and meet multi-level and personalized consumption needs (36kr, 2019). This is directly related to the significant year-on-year growth in the total retail sales of consumer goods since the second half of 2018, especially since the fourth quarter. In 2018, China's total retail sales of consumer goods reached 38.1 trillion yuan, an increase of 9.0% over the previous year, and the growth rate slowed by 1.2 percentage points over the previous year. (不凡商业, 2019) Besides, according to McKinsey and Morgan Stanley, the proportion of Chinese middle-class and wealthy households will increase significantly in the future, with an estimated 2022 to 81%. Among them, the third- and fourth-tier cities grow fastest. By 2030, China's personal consumption will increase from 29.6 trillion yuan in 2016 to 65.3 trillion yuan, with a 66% increase from these markets. (Hao, 2019) This shows that the role of consumption in stimulating economic growth is further highlighted, in which the market represented by small cities, towns and villages is particularly important. What is more, according to the data, the demand for online reading, online video watching, online music listening, online games and broadcasting in small towns in 2017 is higher than the overall level of mobile internet users. In all, third- and fourth-tier cities are created amount of market opportunities (36kr, 2017). In this sense, Kuaishou has become a leader in accurately forecasting market conditions. ‘In the era of mobile short video becoming popular, Kuaishou became the only place to encourage life sharing for ordinary people.’ Lin Xinhe said, ‘the Kuaishou users are exactly the potential main users in China’s short future.’ (36kr, 2017)
However, Kuaishou also wants to engage more users and cover its business not only in the third- and fourth-tier cities to the first- and second-tier cities, because users in big cities could lead to more powerful profitability. However, this change has also encountered some obstacles, which is also the main content of the second point below.
Content authenticity and regulations.
Compared with Tiktok concentrating on strong content operation from platform to user, Kuaishou encourages and protects users’ original content generation ecology in such terms: Algorithm with reciprocal values (which means Kuaishou will not sign with those ‘micro-celebrities’, quality content is the only standard of popularity)（Gong & Li, 2018）and the slogan as ‘recording the world, recording yourself’, etc. (Qi, 2019) From its slogan, it can be analyzed: Recording the world you see and what happens with a rear camera, recording your emotions and daily life with a front camera. In this online community created by Kuaishou, the roles of content producers and audiences can be interchanged and interacted with each other, and this is also Kuaishou’s expectation to let user recording life and socially interacting both by short videos. As Kuaishou’s CEO Hua Su said in his speech in 2018, he regards Kuaishou as a mirror of the real world, users can not only record their lives, but also in defining their own unique happiness.
‘Short video is the most efficient form of information recording nowadays. At the same time, the short video form itself also has inclusiveness, which greatly reduces the threshold for information sharing. Through technical empowerment, everyone could have more fair ability and opportunity to record and share own life. More importantly, the future media must be a two-way connection precisely. You can see the world as well as the world sees you. The content recorded by each person can be accurately passed on to those who like it, and each person can get the content he likes more accurately. Kuaishou, as a mirror of the real world, users can not only record their lives in it, but also in defining their own unique happiness.’ (yi, 2018)
However, this mission and sense of responsibility beyond the business of giving users enough freedom according to user-oriented system, to some extent also could make the company fall into struggles, in which how to define ethical standards is the main issue, such as, for example, behavior such as smoking, drinking, fighting and swearing should be censored, or still be included in the normal content and continue to be automatically judged by the algorithm.
Earthy video is the epitome and representative of these struggles.
In fact, before Kuaishou’s establishment, earthy video has already appeared. In 2006, an album called ‘Song Opera Story Edition - beautiful guy chasing lovers’ get popular in Tianya.com3. In the video, the camera stays still and has no turnaround. Besides simple subtitles, it has no post-processing. There are a man and a woman singing in pairs, while another woman is twisting around. These actors' actions are exaggerated, facial expressions are particularly rich, singing the rhythm of Yunnan lantern music, but there are many vulgar words in the recreated lyrics. The aesthetic conflict of this cultural production even led to further discussion on the vulgar rural culture.
In 2009, a type of subculture called ‘hulutun’ culture become visible in Douban.com4. At this time, users in Douban established the virtual group of ‘earthy culture’. In 2010, the ‘earthy culture group’ was scattered into a number of strange sub-groups, including "the voice of the gourd music", "agricultural metal cooperatives", "taking the confidant to go to the horizon" and so on.
Compared with Tianya and Douban, the unique of Kuaishou is, for the first time, it provides the chance for dialogue between those producers and audiences. Producers finally know what content audience prefer, what value their products could use to explore their content for business based on audiences’ demand. At that time, audiences are not only audiences any more. They are consumers. Welcome to the torrent of ‘earthy cultural industry’!
On the other hand, the balance between content authenticity and regulations become more and more conflicting because of closer connection with producers and audiences, Kuaishou’s user-oriented system, needs of profit, cross-regional aesthetic, class gap and China’s censorship system.
In Kuaishou, many broadcasters utilize rude languages and behave exaggeratedly. For example, they eat stuff that are unsuitable to be regarded as food. Also, some broadcasters use shallow words to express their feelings or educate audiences to follow some rules of life. For example, a live broadcaster, Tian You, who did live freestyle and recognized his works as the quintessence of Chinese culture, indicating his freestyle should be treated the same as Beijing Opera. Also, in Kuaishou, there were adolescent pregnant female broadcasters displaying their life situations, some of them did live shows with their so-called 'husbands' (Liu, 2018). Besides, sexism or even violence generally exist in those videos, females are deemed as betrayers to their husbands, and a broadcaster was even reported to abuse his girlfriend when doing the live show（Liu, 2018）. The hedonism, violence, misogyny and other features of these videos are the reflections of lives of Chinese margined groups. These phenomena finally led to the surveillance. On February 12, 2018, several departments of the Chinese government are reported to jointly take actions to overhaul the videos with harmful and vulgar contents on the Internet, during this action, some broadcasters, for example, Tian You was required to terminate his live shows and clear all the videos in his account (Xin, 2018). All these actions reflect the regulate behaviors of the official to the subculture, to maintain the cultural hegemony.
As a response, Kuaishou makes lots of efforts to change and improve after the regulation. Kuaishou opened ‘Kuaishou Class’ in August 2018, the courses include education, agriculture, music, mechanics, calligraphy and many other sub-categories, such as driving test training, animal and plant conservation and handmade, which could let rural youths obtain the same training opportunities through the platform. Kuaishou also brings the ‘micro-celebrities’ together in the field of agriculture to carry out agricultural technology training, and through them to support the cultivation of new professional farmers, to serve young people to return to their hometowns, and then to empower agriculture. Besides, Kuaishou even invited rural celebrities to Tsinghua University. On September 19, 2018 a one-year program called ‘Kuaishou Rural Entrepreneurship’ officially opened in Tsinghua University. Kuaishou has arranged 20 rural celebrities with professional courses on business management and brand marketing. What is more, Kuaishou are actively cooperating with local governments. In Zhangjiajie, China, Kuaishou also organized an online activity called 'Open Kuaishou, Discover Zhangjiajie' and actively promoted the register of institutional official accounts such as government departments, tourist attractions and travel agencies. Plus, more than 1,000 tour guides have already spontaneously register the Kuaishou account. According to An Long, vice president of Kuaishou, there are already 450,000 Kuaishou users in Zhangjiajie, accounting for more than a quarter of the whole local population. It is no exaggeration to say that Zhangjiajie has become the ‘Kuaishou’ city. More importantly, with the increase of tourists and personal income promoted by the cooperation of Kuaishou and Zhangjiajie government, the deployment of ‘poverty alleviation’ in Zhangjiajie increase the possibility to be realized. Tianzhi Zhou, a native tour guide of Zhangjiajie, he has nearly 1.2 million followers in Kuaishou. He said that after entering Kuaishou, the number of his clients has increased by about 50%, ‘The income was only a few thousand yuan before, but now it has increased by 10,000 yuan a month. My family's living difficulties have been completely improved,’ he said at a press conference.
What is more, in addition to expanding the number of content reviewers, Kuaishou is also supporting its ‘positive energy’ opinion leaders. The ‘MCN cooperation program’ has been officially launched in July 2018. The purpose of the program is to support high-quality content. By cooperating with Kuaishou, those MCN organizations can not only get the operational support of the platform and commercialization support, but also give priority to the new features that have not yet been fully launched. (Sina, 2018)
However, it has also raised another debate although the content of the earthy video has become more diverse: Is quality still the only factor that influence content’s visibility? Is quality only controlled by content generators?
Earthy videos’ Popularity: A Process of Deconstruction and Reconstruction
After we analyzed the longer and dynamic history of Kuaishou and earthy videos, we begin to discuss the relationship between different audience’s attitude and earthy videos’ popularity and try to solve our first research questions: How and why does this cultural production, generated from rural users, also become popular in urban areas?
Shortly, Kuaishou and earthy videos offer them a sense of cultural intimacy (Herzfeld, 1997). This cultural intimacy comes from the audience's interpretation of earthy videos, and this interpretation is itself a process of deconstruction. As Stuart Hall (1977) argues, the process of information encoded and decoded may not be completely symmetrical. Meanwhile, the degree of symmetry, that is, the degree of 'understanding' and 'misunderstanding' in communication, depends on the degree of symmetry/asymmetry (reciprocity) established between 'personification', the position of the coder, the producer and the decoder-receiver. As discussed in the literature review, since cultural intimacy is a cultural trait shared by different level, including national and local, elite and mass, and different spaces of public and private, it is necessary to explain how different classes and areas use intimacy as medium interacting with each other, eliminating the difference, and eventually forming a sense of identity. (Liu, 2017)
On the other hand, as cultural intimacy is closely related to emotions and private life, but these privacies also have a public orientation without exception, especially with new communication technologies and social networks nowadays, cultural intimacy will present more different characteristics. From the interview, the extent of cultural intimacy is not the same, that is, audiences from different areas have different level of adaptations towards, not only earthy videos, but also other peripheral factors. We cannot simply affirm earthy videos are more popular in urban areas than rural areas. It is complex and need to be analyzed in diversified perspectives. Specifically, Urban audiences is easier and more sensible to present their attitude to earthy videos and Kuaishou, rural audiences tend to be more ‘indifferent’ and do not agree earthy videos could reflect any profound cultural issues. While migrants strongly denounce Kuaishou and earthy videos. How is this pattern formed? How is their intimacy constructed?
Before discussing these questions, it should be pointed out: culture intimacy to whom or what? In this part, the interview data will be used to compare the three kinds of audiences in two categories.
Intimacy to earthy videos and their content generators.
In general, audiences in rural and urban areas both like the type of earthy videos with funny, relaxing jokes, gestures, words being said in a rhyming way. From 15 interviews in both areas, 8 of them mentioned ‘Giao Bro’, who is a ‘micro-celebrity’ in Kuaishou, and his video, could be a representative of earthy videos.
Giao Bro, whose real name is Yapeng, Zhan, born in a small town, named Tao Cheng Town, in He Nan province. Tao Cheng Town only has 59000 total population, in which 52,000 people has belonged to the ‘Rural Hukou’. Yapeng, Zhan (Giao Bro) is just an ordinary person in this community. However, when most of the people were concerning about how to lift out poverty, Giao Bro registered his Kuaishou account and insisted on publishing his own rap video in Kuaishou. In this sense, he is a ‘dreamer’. Two years later, he became the fashion icon for the young Chinese group with the identity of ‘Kuaishou micro-celebrity’, ‘rapper’ and ‘singer’ with nearly one million followers in Kuaishou. Strictly speaking, Giao Bro’s works are difficult to define. From a professional point of view, it is hard to say his work has met professional standards; From the amateur perspective of audiences, it is more like a period of no nutrition.
Rural interviewees tend to define Giao Bro’s video as 'funny, but he is very hard to make a living by this', and the view of urban respondents is 'the content of the video is very funny, but such performance is not decent, I feel sad for him.' Although the video is attractive because of funny elements, the focus and attitude of rural and urban audiences are different. The rural audience is more likely to have a sense of ‘rueful recognition’ (Liu, 2017) because they are under a similar living environment and be able to generate more resonance. For instance, one of interviewee, who became a farmer after graduating from high school. He said that Giao Bro has become the ‘pillar’ of his life, because his words and value are very positive and energetic. Every time he is tired, he will watch his video as a spiritual power. Similar to what Prof. Chris.K.K argues, ‘middle- and upper-classed outsiders might consider these micro-celebrities’ bland-looking onscreen personas and lack of education as shameful, but these micro-celebrities nonetheless provided the students with internal solidarity.’ In this sense, Kuaishou offered rural audiences a sense of cultural intimacy between themselves to content generators in Kuaishou, like Giao Bro, although Giao Bro still be seen as a ‘micro-celebrity with embarrassing and vulgar gesture’ in many people’s perspective, he really provide a sense of belonging and cultural familiarity to those rural high school students.
However, some urban audience is in an 'elite perspective' and thinks that they have a certain sense of superiority compared to those Kuaishou user. One of interviewee, who has a PHD degree and is a researcher in Shenzhen, said users like Giao Bro, their motivation may be that their life is not going well, so they just want to be famous quickly and get followers and income. Besides, when he was asked whether he found anything motivational in earthy videos, he said, ‘no, I don't need inspiration. I almost have everything in life.’ He argued that the main purpose to watch these earthy videos, instead of relaxing, is to ‘give myself a sense of self-satisfaction’. ‘I think I'm more respectable by the society. Although I know their income might be higher, but simple compare income is meaningless. The most profitable things are written in the criminal law, but nobody will do, right?’
What is more, there are other differences in the performance of audiences’ cultural intimacy in urban and rural areas. Firstly, although the ‘elite perspective’ could still be seen from urban audiences, their ‘internal stratification’ in their attitude is quite obvious.
Their angle of watching earthy video could be divided into two categories: superiority (such as the PHD interviewee) and less superiority but more rationally. Another interviewee, master student of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, she admitted that ‘we (urban people) are still in a condescending view, we just watching those videos, rather than appreciating. However, I think the gap between city people and rural people is objectively existed. Therefore, the superiority of city people is inevitable. We cannot throw away superiority, then look at them in an equal manner. For example, you could see their sweaty performance in the field in summer when you lie in an air-conditioned room. It is sad to say, but still, their hard work might never be empathized by us. Unless we were them, otherwise it cannot be objective, and we can only be said to be relatively objective. We can only say that compared with those who do not know themselves in a position of superiority, the most thing we can do is to realize our urban people’s superiority and try to understand the content of the videos.’
Secondly, compared to rural audiences and migrants, urban audiences have stronger attitude towards ‘confrontation and negotiation’ with the text as conditional acceptance or refusion to the video. An urban student strongly expresses his view, when he was asked whether he could accept the content if he don’t like its values, he said, ‘No, I love Giao Bro is because I love all of him, I can only accept this value only because this is from Giao Bro, he and his value are indispensable.’ In fact, it is also the view of rural interviewees, which is, love it, love it all, hate it, hate it all. However, urban respondents also showed another attitude, for instance, one urban interviewee said that, I watch earthy video is purely because I want to share it to my best friend because she is a big fan of Giao Bro. I will not stop watching them just because the value or gestures which I dislike. I also meet some new friends in the online chat room. They are all the fans of Giao Bro but we have never discussed the value of his video. We all gathered together just because of fun. Another interviewee has the similar opinion toward it, she said that she likes the way which Giao Bro present his value to audience in a ‘rhyming way’, such as ‘firstly, make a living, then find a lover’, ‘Either dare to love or dare to hate, either happy or heartless, keep purity’. She said, ‘It has nothing related with my personal situation, even I know they're acting, but I still think it's very funny and cute.’ Based on that ‘conditional acceptance’ attitude, it could be seen, to those urban interviewees, their attitude tends to be more complex. Besides, their objective of cultural intimacy is the externality of the earthy video—forms, jokes, gestures, not the internality—values, spirits and ideas.
What has affected their intimacy? Their educational level, native culture background, aesthetic difference and personal interest is obvious to consider. Apart from these, their social circle could also affect their intimacy to earthy videos. Rural audiences say that their surroundings are all fond of watching earthy videos. Their cultural intimacy is relatively ‘closed and firm’, while urban audiences and immigrants worry about watching such video could bring bad stereotypes from their social circle, so they will make selective choices or even extremely express their ‘disliked’ feelings.
One interviewee from the Chinese University of Hong Kong said, ‘I will share them in SNS because I want to share happiness. But it won't be shown to everyone. Others’ feeling to earthy videos will change my sharing behavior. I think I'll share the proper content with specific people, not everyone. Exhibiting a specific aspect can have an impact on our relationship. I will control my own behavior, not to affect others’ While the interviewees from rural areas all declared it will not be a matter because the communication network around them don’t not have strong attitude toward earthy videos and it also cannot affect their relationships.
Intimacy with rural life conditions.
Even watching the same video, audiences from different areas could also emerge different degree of cultural intimacy to rural environment and life conditions.
From the interview, rural audiences argue that earthy videos cannot show the full or even ‘true picture’ of rural environments, urban participants hold the similar opinion that these videos still could not truly promote their understanding to rural areas. While, in this level, the attitude of migrants is quite unique: they avoided to talk about such topics and put more attention in their current urban life.
Firstly, it is necessary to take geographic factors into account, which is also one of the aims for choosing three type of people who have diverse geographical experience, because it could lead to people’s differential psychological presupposition to small towns and villages. Rural environment is, as the rural as the local and the known, the urban as ‘the other side’, and the migrants as hometown. In this sense, the reason why rural audience could not produce the intimacy toward rural environments might be simple--they have already been too familiar with that. Two of rural interviewees straightly said: ‘(the scene in earthy videos) is not the real rural landscape, most of them are artificial constructed by those celebrities.’ One of the interviewees from city gave another explanation, that is, although villages are ‘the other side’ to her, she has already known something about the countryside. ‘These videos could only be said to coincide with my understanding, that is, poor and backward. The living environment has no tall buildings and no pollution. I think some of the videos are fake. Sometimes they are too deliberately indigenous, even more indigenous than the real countryside. I feel that no one can see the real life in the countryside through that video. Because only the more exaggerated performance can catch audiences’ eyes and normally. More exaggerated, more unreal.’
Secondly, their responses also show the influence of class hierarchy and social status. Among them, immigrants are the most representative group. One of our interviewees, a salesperson in a gym who criticized the earthy videos by indicating the videos are vulgar, also he showed strong willingness to engage in the city life and would like to distinguish his identity as an intelligent person: ‘The videos cannot help me with my business, and I don’t think normal people nowadays are interested in those videos, they are more suitable for pupils. I prefer to other videos, for example, some videos can teach me philosophy in life and after watching these videos, I usually take screenshots of some meaningful sentences and post them to my WeChat Moments. I don’t have a good educational background. To distinguish myself, I want to make my WeChat Moments be similar with those urban white-collar workers, which will also be beneficial to my business.’
Additionally, they tend to improve themselves by reading, such as philosophy and commercial books. Compared with urban audiences, they resided in the countryside for a certain period before moving to Shenzhen, and are familiar with the rural way of life, thus, they have less curiosity to the earthy videos like urban audience do. What’s more, since Shenzhen is a highly developed metropolitan, even the villages in the city are well equipped with urbanized infrastructures and the villages are not far from urban areas. Hence, for those rural audiences who have the intention to merge into the city culture, rejecting what are deemed as 'earthy' by the urban people is a strategy.
Those migrant interviewees, who left their hometown to realize their dreams about urban and modern life, their individualized process are indeed faced with a paradox of 'de-embedding' and 're-embedding'. (Yan, 2008) As the literature review introduced, individual’s cultural intimacy is not unchangeable, except that it can deepen collective consciousness among existing community or construct a new community identity, individuals also could actively get rid of their original cultural circle, and then create intimacy with other culture. This individualization is also a process of socialization. To reduce the failures and avoid risks when they embrace an unfamiliar social sphere, they are adopting an 'intimate individualization', that is, individual freedom, independence and even social rebellion from their original social background. They are always in the process of continuous integration and adaptation with all kinds of ‘intimate knowledge’ to get an identity closed to the new environment as soon as possible. (Steinmuller, 2013)
To sum up, through the above analysis of interview data, it could be seen that audiences’ cultural intimacy is not only towards the culture familiar with themselves. Some audiences may have cultural intimacy with seemingly unfamiliar objects, such as urban audiences to earthy videos, while others may have a sense of alienation from their original culture.
Popularity of earthy videos: Reality or ‘Staged Reality’
The second research question of this paper is, does this trend of ‘popularity’ among audiences a true picture of reality? By the interview result, the popularity of earthy videos could be constituted somehow by an illusion. Instead of on the certain basis of people’s class, education level and cultural background, this illusion may also made by other different ‘filters’. Although these videos share the same name of ‘earthy videos’, what people see may not be the same. They could not see the true scene of rural areas.
What are these filters? We tend to analyze this question into three layers: content producers, audiences and platforms.
Content producers: Capital manipulation and artificial landscape.
As content producers, on the one hand, their content could be influenced by capital manipulation. As mentioned in the chapter introducing the history of Kuaishou and earthy videos, the quality of content has been constructed by complex elements, in which capital manipulation will lead to a huge difference. In fact, in addition to the support from Kuaishou, the celebrities will also actively sign up with external studios. These studios are similar to the PR agency, responsible for these celebrities’ content release, brand cooperation and other personal matters, for example, the Kuaishou celebrity Di Wu has signed a contract of 18.3 million with one MCN company. From this perspective, the content they published cannot be counted as “completely from the heart”, nor can they fully meet the vision of ‘Kuaishou, a mirror of the real world’.
On the other hand, earthy videos still cannot show the 100% real scene of rural areas. As one of rural interviewees argued, he could clearly recognize what kind of backgrounds of the video is made by artificial, some of them are ‘too dirty mess’ while some are ‘too neat’. These are too deliberate, making audience’s cultural intimacy is not built on a real reality, but a ‘staged reality’.
Audiences: information receiving channels and stereotypes.
Audiences themselves should also take the responsibility. One reason is their different information receiving channels. All interviewees from city said they watched the ‘secondary spread’ version of earthy video through weibo and Bilibili, while the rural watched it through Kuaishou. The content of the two platforms led to their different understanding of the video. Take Giao Bro as example, Giao Bro's fame has a close relationship with Weibo's account named ‘tuweiwajueji’ and ‘tuweilaodie’. In September 2017, these bloggers saw these videos, moved them from Kuaishou to Weibo, which is the first chance of Giao Bro getting popular on Weibo. However, the content they forwarded is screened. They have several customers like Hawker, Head & Shoulders and Netease News. Because of that, they would choose the videos which could make the slogan of the brands reasonably embedded into. What is more, the censorship system in China also ask them to compliance with regulations. Another secret of the popularity of Giao Bro is the re-edition by users named ‘Up Owners’ of the Bilibili’. On April 24th, the click volume of ‘Giao Bro’ video by user ‘Ahuahua’ was 675,000. After 4 days, another video reached 1.83 million-page views. In addition, there are more than ten Giao Bro’s videos on the Bilibili with more than 200,000 broadcasts. If watching these videos carefully, it would be found that the re-creation by Bilibili users has greatly improved the quality and the style of earthy videos, making it more popular among urban youth. In one video called ‘China Giao’, the frame contains multiple images, as 2-3 dynamic images of Giao bro in the screen at the same time, in the form of superimpositions with the frame ratio of 16:9. The shoot angle is a shallow, sharp focus with overhead (looking right down on to the scene) angle, increasing many fade, dissolve and jump cutting skills. The rhythm of the video has been also changed, from a slow speed, only first perspective focus of the character to a series of progressively shorter scenes contribute to the accumulation of tension as a narrative climax develops. Background music is improved with tensive music, less environmental sound and accelerated speech as a form of rap. Giao Bro, in this video, speaks the key lyrics— ‘I am China Giao’ in English, and Bilibili users add all the lyrics with English subtitles.
The native video from Kuaishou, the screening and handling of Weibo, the re-creation by Bilibili, and the meme used in the online chatting in people’s social circles have become the matrix of Giao Bro's invasion of the whole online society. The derivation of the media platform enables this cultural production to have the chance to be transmitted throughout the cyberspace, but the information from the cultural production received by the audiences in different regions is not the same. Through interviews, they still access the information through single contact, which means, the platform they tend to use based on their own preferences. For instance, all the urban interviewees confessed they have never downloaded Kuaishou because they consider most of the content in kuaishou is vulgar. One of the reasons they see earthy videos as interesting is because what they received is the ‘screened’ earthy video, not the true one. It could also lead to the information cocoons as Sunstein considers that people's information acquisition will be habitually guided by their own interests, thus shackling their lives in the phenomenon of ‘information cocoons’ like silkworm cocoons. (Sunstein, 2006)
Secondly, the stereotypes to earthy videos and rural life also become a border. No matter what kind of audience, they all have stereotypes about the earthy video. The rural and immigrant audiences tend to have a low opinion of the earthy video, while the urban audience tends to be ‘interesting and funny’. One key reason had to be noticed is, their stereotypes toward earthy videos could also reflect their bias toward rural areas, especially to urban audiences. As we mentioned before, audiences have already had psychological presuppositions to these small towns and villages. Through the interview, 4 of 5 or urban interviewees said what they like the neat, picturesque rural scene, not areas with barren lands and narrow roads. ‘I don't care or even know very well that the background of many earthy videos is artificially built, but I don’t think it's a big issue. The beautiful scenery is pleasing to the eye. And it is also a measure of quality.’ One of the interviewees from city said. Compared to rural and migrant interviewee, the gap between the rural areas they accept and the real rural areas is greater, which could also lead to one moral argument: Which one is more acceptable, the ‘polished rural’ or ‘rural rural’?
Platforms: recommendation algorithm and screening system.
Last but importantly, platforms could also be the ‘promotor’ of this ‘staged reality’. Audiences’ cultural intimacy may be ‘passively produced’ by algorithms. As the concept of ‘filter bubble’ (Pariser, 2011) keep arguing, algorithms of platforms will also continue to recommend homogeneous content for the audience. Since algorithm recommendation has become the ‘new normal status’ for the entire Internet platform, what is really special is Kuaishou’s own screening system. In 2017, in a speech by the Kuaishou CEO Hua Su, he emphasized that, ‘we are pursuing a balanced, equitable and all-benefit value.’ (Jiang, 2017), What is ‘all-benefit value’? It is not a fresh concept. In 1980, at the beginning of the Internet, the Englishman Tim Berners-Lee came to the European Nuclear Research Center, proposing to establish an open, decentralized connection, thus making the computer a tool that the public can use. He invented the World Wide Web through hypertext, the website, webpage, web address, opening the era of the global Internet. Since then, openness and decentralization have become the spirit of the Internet. However, driven by commercial interests, the global Internet has become increasingly centralized over the past decades: the giants control of profit distribution, powerful control the monetization rules, and significantly increase business efficiency, while also posing a threat to innovation and fairness. In this era, the Internet platform is already the underlying infrastructure of the digital economy and has public attributes. Once again, whether the Internet should be the public or commercial attributes have become the focus of attention. Kuaishou, as a platform for recording the lives of ordinary people, its public attribute is obvious. Through this way, the audience could form a unique cultural intimacy and have a chance to create common identity across class, region, educational level. However, recent year, Kuaishou itself seems to be against its promise of ‘all-benefit value’ by recommendation algorithm and screening system to the free flow of information through commercial operations. Where is its inclusive and all-benefit value anymore?
Conclusion
Under the impetus of the Internet and new media, private space has become more of a virtual public space, which not only creates a common identity and joint consciousness among different groups in different regions, but also makes ‘amplified intimacy’ be possible. Thus, audiences tend to argue earthy culture, supposed to be a subculture, are becoming more and more popular because they could see more people are enjoying by it. However, it cannot be denied that there still have many misunderstandings caused by filters and borders between pop culture and subculture.
This world as an 'interconnected cultural space' where cultural flows are multidirectional rather than from one 'core' in the urban to a non-urban 'periphery'. (International Panel on Social Progress, 2016). Audience’s cultural taste not just depends on their original class, as the CCCS and Bourdieu mainly argues, class still exist, new influencing factors to people’s cultural intimacy also matters. The causal relationship between class and cultural taste becomes weaker and harder to conclude. Nowadays, this ‘cultural heightened entanglement’ could be caused by more complicated types of audience’s identity, digital technology, platforms and censorships. Another point which could not be ignored is it also could be caused by filters and borders, make people more and more difficult to see the true picture of one culture, they only see the ‘staged reality’.
Earthy video, as a cultural narrative originated from rural villages and getting popular among urban elites, offers its audiences to expand their cultural repertoire, a possible window onto urban-rural integrating processes. However, seeking to keep up with ongoing social change, the videos present cross-border communication's shifting experiential terrain, which involves more than merely presenting a positive face of cross border and better ‘see the other side’. The intimacy from audiences to videos also address its incoherence, confusion, and disruptions.
Through the analysis of the audience's cultural intimacy, we can see what are the driving factors of the trend that sub-culture becomes pop culture. However, be careful, this may be just an illusion. Only by entering the specific audience culture circle and analyzing the specific context, can we better understand the meaning of ‘popular’.
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